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Chapter 10 Labor Market Institutions and Restructuring in U.S. 
Deregulated Telecommunications Services 
Rosemary Batt 
1. Introduction 
This chapter summarizes some of the recent literature concerning the changing 
nature of markets, technology, and employment relations in deregulated tele-
communications services in the United States. It draws on arguments and evi-
dence from a series of studies over the last five years, most of which were under-
taken by researchers at Cornell, MIT, and Rutgers universities in the United 
States. The research focuses on the relationship between market deregulation 
and technology change on the one hand, and changing business strategy, organ-
izational structure, union relations, and work organization on the other. This 
chapter focuses on the extent to which labor market institutions have influenced 
the content and outcomes of work restructuring. The central argument is that the 
weakness of industrial relations institutions in the U.S. context has meant that 
managerial prerogative has dominated the manner in which both market de-
regulation and corporate restructuring have occurred. Unions largely have par-
ticipated in effects bargaining, and have successfully negotiated contracts that 
minimize the negative outcomes of restructuring for employees and provide sig-
nificant opportunities for union institutional security. I begin by briefly summa-
rizing the state of work organization and employment relations prior to deregu-
lation, and then review changes in markets, union institutions, business strategy, 
and work organization under deregulation.1 
1 The paper draws heavily on Keefe and Batt 1997, which particularly analyzes the 
course of deregulation and technology change, and their implications for work organi-
zation; Keefe and Boroff 1994, which analyzes post-divestiture collective bargaining 
outcomes; Batt and Strausser (1998), which examines de-unionization and labor market 
outcomes based on the current population survey (CPS); and Batt and Keefe 1999, 
which updates the analysis of changing industry structures with particular attention to 
customer segmentation strategies and labor market outcomes. Readers should consult 
original sources for elaboration of concepts and evidence presented here. 
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2. Pre-Divestiture Internal Labor Markets 
Nineteen eighty-four usually is viewed as the dividing line between the old and 
new era of the U.S. telecommunications industry. Prior to that date, the AT&T 
Bell System was the regulated monopoly telecommunications provider. AT&T 
provided virtually all long distance domestic service, supplied 92 percent of 
local service, employed over 90% of the industry's 1.1 million workforce, and 
owned the world's largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer (West-
ern Electric) and premier research laboratory (Bell Labs). In the 1984 court-or-
dered divestiture of AT&T, the long distance and equipment manufacturing 
businesses were allocated to AT&T, under deregulated market conditions. Local 
service was consolidated from 22 local companies into 7 regional Bell operating 
companies (RBOCs), which retained their monopoly status. The U.S. Congress 
passed legislation in 1996 to deregulate local markets, but actual local competi-
tion has been slow to materialize. 
Historically, federal and state regulation was designed to ensure that the Bell 
system would provide universal telephone service at reasonable rates by realiz-
ing substantial economies of scale inherent in the telephone network. To do so, 
regulators set local and residential telephone rates below cost, and subsidized 
them by overcharging long distance and business service. Regulators also pro-
vided for a reasonable rate of return on necessary investments and for legitimate 
costs of operating the system. AT&T provided reliable voice transmission 
through a highly efficient and centralized operating system, with collectively-
bargained contracts that established common human resource practices for vir-
tually all 725,000 union-eligible employees across the system. A standardized 
national system of internal labor markets also covered managerial employees 
(Howard and Bray 1988; Batt 1996). 
The Bell work system in 1980 had many of the features of "high performance 
work systems" currently advocated (Kochan and Osterman 1994). Despite the 
constraints imposed by bureaucracy, it offered quality service at relatively low 
cost through state-of-the-art technology for its time. Operator services were 
highly taylorized from an early date (see Kohl 1993), but business office (cus-
tomer service) and network technician jobs were relatively highly skilled, semi-
autonomous, and problem-solving in orientation.2 Employees frequently knew 
2 While operators declined from 47 percent of the workforce in 1950 to 16 percent in 
1980, craft specialties rose from 24 to 44 percent, and business office, from 5 to 11 per-
cent. To supervise these hard-to-monitor jobs, the managerial workforce grew from 
13.5 percent of the Bell system in 1950 to 29.3 percent in 1980, a ratio of managers to 
workers of 1:2.4. Elimination of low skilled operator and clerical jobs led to a shift in 
workforce gender composition from roughly 70 percent female in 1946 to 52 percent in 
1980 (Keefe and Batt 1997: 69; Keefe and Boroff 1994: 313). 
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their customers well, either as neighbors or through repeated transactions; cus-
tomer satisfaction was high according to surveys. Most entry-level jobs required 
a high school education; entrance examinations and selection procedures were 
highly selective; and employees received high levels of company-paid formal 
training and retraining. The well-developed system of internal job ladders cre-
ated on-going opportunities for advancement and lifetime security. Informal 
training supported continuous learning, as technologies and procedures regularly 
changed. The broadly defined job classifications provided considerable labor 
flexibility, and when coupled with job security, workers rarely resisted new 
technologies and productivity improvements. Job security was part of the social 
contract, and workers reciprocated with high levels of loyalty, commitment, and 
obedience (Keefe and Batt 1997). 
3. Industry Structure and Technology 
Despite almost two decades of attempts at deregulation in the United States, the 
industry structure in 2000 is highly centralized and dominated by former Bell 
companies, which continue to employ the majority of the industry's workforce. 
AT&T still accounts for over half of the long distance market and the regional 
Bells and GTE provide 90 percent of wireline local service. Despite the 1996 
Telecommunications Act designed to deregulate local service, the Regional 
Bells continue to act as regulated monopolies. AT&T, the Regional Bells, and 
GTE supply 90 percent of wireless cellular service, although Personal Commu-
nications Services (digital wireless) offers more competition. 
Moreover, mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures accelerated in the 1990s. 
For example, seven regional Bells became five after the mergers of Pacific Bell 
and Southwestern Bell, and NYNEX and Bell Atlantic. SBC (Southwestern 
Bell) acquired Southern New England Telephone, a former Bell affiliate that 
was fully divested by AT&T in 1984. A merger between Bell Atlantic and GTE 
was approved in 1999. Through acquisitions, GTE has grown from a handful of 
rural telephone companies into the largest provider of local telephone access and 
a major competitor on the Internet. AT&T's acquisition of Teleport provided 
AT&T with immediate local access to many of the largest urban business cus-
tomers, and transformed AT&T's position in competitive local access markets 
almost as dramatically as AT&T's earlier acquisition of McCaw Cellular, which 
overnight made AT&T the nation's largest wireless provider. Upstart World-
Com transformed itself into a major telecommunications powerhouse through 
mergers and acquisitions. It became the largest supplier in long distance leased 
data lines, acquired the second largest local competitive access carrier, Metro 
133 
Fiber Systems (MFS), and with the acquisition of MCI, dominates the Internet 
backbone with a 60% market share (see Keefe 1998). 
Bringing competition to the U.S. telecommunications industry has been com-
plicated by the presence of network externalities, scale economies, excess capac-
ity, and technological uncertainty. Firms that operate network production pro-
cesses are subject to economies of scale. They invest in costly communications 
networks which represent a substantial sunk fixed cost embedded in long-lived 
facilities with excess capacity. Once the network is constructed, the marginal 
cost of another type of communication is essentially zero. In addition, digitali-
zation has dramatically transformed transmission capabilities, substantially in-
creasing the amount and speed with which information is transmitted, reducing 
distortion, and allowing many more options (voice, video, data, imaging). Fi-
nally, digitalization places all transmission media in direct competition with 
each other (e.g., wireline, wireless, cable, Internet). In sum, the economics of the 
telecommunications industry as well as technological uncertainty have created 
incentives for companies to merge, form partnerships, and diversify across com-
peting technologies. These factors coupled with the legacy of the Bell system 
help explain why the industry continues to be highly concentrated; this in turn, 
has important implications for business strategy and employment practices 
(Keefe and Batt 1997; Batt and Keefe 1999). 
4. Union Institutions 
Two unions represent workers in U.S. telecommunications: the Communications 
Workers of America (CWA) and the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers (IBEW). Historically, CWA, by far the dominant union, was a highly-
decentralized, company-dominated employee association. It became independ-
ent in the 1940s, and succeeded in establishing national bargaining for all mem-
bers in 1974. Without the cost pressures of competitive markets, labor relations 
were historically cooperative; and the CWA was one of the first unions to em-
brace joint union-management quality of worklife (QWL) programs, beginning 
in 1980. With the breakup of the Bell system in 1984, collective bargaining was 
decentralized to local telephone companies, and then reconfigured into enter-
prise-level bargaining (with separate contracts for AT&T and each of the re-
gional Bell companies) (Katz and Darbishire 1999; Darbishire 2000). 
Despite the only partial deregulation of the industry between 1983 and 1996, 
union density fell significantly from 55.5 percent of the total workforce to 28.7 
percent over the period. The rate of deunionization also accelerated; over two 
thirds of the decline occurred between 1990 and 1996. Overall, about half of the 
decline was due to the greater relative growth of managerial and professional job 
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titles, and about half was due to deunionization among union-eligible (non-mana-
gerial) workers. Among union-eligible workers, union membership fell from 
roughly 72 percent in 1983 to 46 percent in 1996. Deunionization among union-
eligible workers was due to two forces. First, newer companies such as MCI. 
Sprint and Cable TV giants, such as TCI, fiercely fought union drives in their 
facilities. Second, former Bell companies redefined traditional bargaining unit 
titles as managerial and exempt from labor laws; and they created or acquired 
unregulated "enterprise units" to handle wireless and other activities. 
Overall, union-management relations in the former Bell companies went from 
cooperative, prior to divestiture, to highly adversarial, after 1984, when most 
companies began cost-cutting and downsizing activities. Several strikes ensued. 
Labor relations varied by region, however, with more adversarial relations in the 
north and north-east of the United States (Clifton 1999), than in right-to-work 
states in the south and west where jointly-sponsored productivity partnerships 
continued until the early 1990s (Batt and Darbishire 1997). Despite evidence of 
good performance outcomes associated with jointly-sponsored innovations such 
as employee participation and teams (e.g. Batt 1999a, 1999b), most joint pro-
grams were abandoned by the early 1990s as reengineering and consolidation 
programs came to dominate company resources. 
Despite decentralization and regional variation, the unions maintained a fairly 
strong de facto pattern of bargaining. Keefe and Boroff (1994) provide a full 
analysis of contracts with former Bell companies negotiated in 1986, 1989, and 
1992; the analysis is updated to 1995 in Batt and Keefe (1999). In general, union 
strategies since divestiture have focused heavily on limiting the negative effects 
of corporate cost-cutting and downsizing efforts. On the one hand, the employ-
ers succeeded in large-scale employment reductions, the elimination of cost-of-
living adjustments (COLAs), the introduction of cost-sharing in health insur-
ance, and in some cases, the introduction of contingent pay, including profit-
sharing, and commission pay for service and sales workers. The unionized 
workforce declined by 30 to 60 percent in the former Bell companies. On the 
other hand, the unions succeeded in negotiating wages that tracked the U.S. Cost 
of Living Index (CPI) (almost 3 percent annually), included generous severance 
packages and pension buyouts for surplused workers, and contained union 
institutional security clauses that limit anti-union employer activity and in some 
cases, provided for card-check recognition in organizing campaigns. The indus-
try model for employment security and training was negotiated by NYNEX in 
1994 (Clifton 1998a, 1998b, 1999). 
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5. Restructuring and Business Strategy 
Among the former Bell companies, AT&T has set the model for restructuring -
focusing heavily on marketing, technology investments, and diversification. 
Between 1984 and 1992, AT&T cut 60 percent of its unionized workforce and at 
least 30 percent of its managers. It restructured into market-driven business units 
targeting particular customer segments; invested heavily in digital transmission 
and switching systems; reengineered processes to enhance remote servicing and 
repair capabilities; and undertook mergers, partnerships, and alliances to diver-
sify into cellular and cable markets. It did not pursue a strategy based on high 
involvement or high commitment human resource practices, or union-manage-
ment cooperation, except in isolated instances. Managerial prerogative was 
largely unimpeded by union influence or constraints. 
The regional Bell companies tended to imitate the AT&T strategy, but with 
some lag time and additional constraints, including state Public Utility Commis-
sions (PUCs) and the role played by unions in influencing public opinion. Over-
all, the regional Bell companies reduced the workforce in their regulated busi-
nesses by 28 percent between 1984 and 1993. Most of these reductions occurred 
through attrition, or voluntary retirement programs. In anticipation of the 1996 
National Telecommunications Act, however, regional Bell companies announced 
a reduction of another 100,000 in the regulated core, or roughly 20 percent of 
the workforce, to take place largely through forced reductions. Many of these 
proved unnecessary, however, for several reasons: competition in local services 
lagged, growth in the demand for local access lines was grossly underestimated 
(particularly, second lines for Internet access), the forecasted rapid transition to a 
fiber optic local access network proved to be wrong, and the general economic 
expansion of the U.S. economy continued through the 1990s(Keefe and Batt 
1997). 
With respect to customer strategies, all of the major players (former Bell 
companies, independents, and new entrants) are attempting to develop the most 
cost effective ways to provide customized packages of information services par-
ticularly to higher-end business and residential consumers. All players seek to 
compete on cost, quality, and customer service by taking advantage of network 
system economies and becoming single-source providers of all information serv-
ices to these customers. To do so, they have adopted segmented marketing strat-
egies that differentiate customers by value-added, ranging from high value-added 
corporate clients to various business segments, to differentiation among lower-
value added residential consumers. Each is also investing billions of dollars in 
trying to differentiate their highly standardized network service offerings by 
building brand names. 
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Most major players have used advanced information systems and process re-
engineering to support their market segmentation strategies while also reducing 
costs. Advanced information systems allow companies to consolidate operations 
into large remote service centers, each dedicated to particular clientele; process 
reengineering automates many service functions so that telephone service may 
be turned on remotely without the help of field technicians. Re-engineered 
information systems also allow remote diagnosis and repair of services. Over-
head and direct labor costs fall while customer response time improves. After 
reengineering at GTE, for example, the percent of residential phone orders that 
are automatically established doubled, from 33% in the past to 61%. The most 
dramatic examples of consolidation occurred at AT&T and GTE - both of which 
faced an early challenge of creating standardized customer service and network 
organizations to serve national markets. By the early 1990s, for example, AT&T 
had consolidated hundreds of customer service bureaus into six national mega-
centers and reduced the number of network operations centers to two. Similarly, 
GTE, consolidated 258 local worksites into 58 regionally-based service centers, 
and has built a single network operations center in Dallas (Batt and Keefe 1999). 
In contrast to the past, customer service jobs in the U.S. telecommunications 
industry now are divided into those serving residential, small business, or large 
business customers. Job functions are usually further divided into sales and 
service, billing, collections, and repair services. The type of segment served is a 
strong determinant of the design of work and human resource practices. For ex-
ample, in a recent empirical analysis based on a nationally-representative survey 
of customer service establishments, customer segment was a significant deter-
minant of skill level, technology use, work design, and HR incentives such as 
training, pay, and promotion opportunities (Batt 2000). Outsourcing of tele-
marketing and operator services also has accelerated in the 1990s. 
By far the largest proportion of the workforce in U.S. telecommunications 
serves the residential or retail market. A typical residential call center houses 
between 500 and 1,000 customer service representatives (CSRs) who handle 90-
100 customers per day and have a call cycle time of about 3-5 minutes. CSRs 
complete transactions with customers on-line and are discouraged from inter-
acting with fellow employees. As soon as one call ends, an automatic call distri-
bution (ACD) system automatically sends another customer call to the "open" 
representative. Many of the interactions with customers are scripted by expert 
systems. The system software prompts selling opportunities. Residential CSR 
jobs are the most stressful ones in the industry - higher than the short cycle 
highly demanding telephone operator jobs - because of intense pressure to 
simultaneously sell, provide "quality" service, and turnover calls, all in the con-
text of pervasive electronic monitoring. Electronic monitoring records both the 
content of customer-employee interaction and the time employees spend in each 
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type of work activity. Company-developed algorithms provide targets as to the 
amount of time allowable in each type of activity. Bell companies have adopted 
widespread use of policies to enforce 90 percent "adherence" to schedules. For 
example, if CSRs are late in taking their breaks because they are handling a 
customer call, often they must go to their supervisor to get special approval. In 
some residential service centers, CSRs must raise their hands and request super-
visory permission to take a rest room break. 
Call centers for small business representatives generally house 100 to 200 
employees, and business representatives handle approximately 30 customers per 
day. Because their orders are somewhat complex, they cannot be handled on-
line with the customer on hold. Rather, the business representative takes down 
the information, enters some of it into a computerized database, and spends con-
siderable time off the telephone completing the order. The pace in small busi-
ness centers tends to be fairly reasonable, and representatives freely consult with 
each other to solve non-routine problems or get advice on how to handle a cus-
tomer. 
For large business and institutional accounts, companies hire college-edu-
cated account executives who are supposed to provide "one-stop-shopping" to 
corporate clients. Compensation plans rely heavily on commission pay. They 
provide customized service through on-site and electronic exchanges and usu-
ally rely on additional support staff to handle the mechanics of order processing. 
The former internal career ladders in female-dominated jobs have been broken 
up somewhat: residential, small-business, and large business offices in the same 
company are often located in different cities; residential representatives may 
move to small business centers, but further advancement usually depends on 
getting a college degree and the demonstrated ability to sell. 
For the technical workforce, network operations have simplified their occu-
pational structure by moving toward single top craft occupations that are organ-
ized by functional activity, such as outside plant technician or central office 
technician. The single title concept, however, should not be confused with the 
concept of the fully cross-trained worker; virtually no technicians in U.S. tele-
communications are fully cross-trained. While technicians carry the same title 
and pay, they do not perform the same work. New technologies and new organ-
izational structures have given rise to new sub-specialties. The single title gives 
operations management the flexibility from each company's human resource 
bureaucracy to rapidly re-deploy the workforce according to changes in technol-
ogy and in the demand for network services without testing, job posting or job 
bidding. 
Technical work also follows the model where market segmentation leads to 
occupational stratification. The customers' location and equipment determine 
the technician and his or her level of training and compensation. For example, 
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technicians serving residential customers have relatively lower skills and pay, 
and are often covered under separate "two-tier" wage agreements or are non-
union subcontractors. By contrast, large business customers are serviced by "en-
hanced crews" of highly trained top craft cable splicers and special services 
technicians who work on fiber optics, multiplexors, subscriber loop carrier sys-
tems (SLCS pronounced Slick) and other advanced loop electronics. Market 
segmentation now means that customers in residential markets can receive 
service from technicians who receive half the compensation of those serving 
business clients and are trained at a ratio of 3 weeks verses 3 to 5 years of com-
bined school and on-the-job learning. 
6. Labor Market Outcomes 
Within the former U.S. Bell companies, on-going downsizing and organizational 
instability undermined the historic social contract of implicit employment secu-
rity among Bell System employees. Workforce demoralization was severe, es-
pecially at AT&T (Keefe and Boroff 1994), but also in other companies; and it 
included managers as well as workers (Batt 1996). In the industry more gener-
ally, deregulation and de-unionization have been associated with the growth of 
wage inequality, especially after 1990 when it grew significantly. This has oc-
curred through a decline in the real wages of non-union workers: by 14.4 percent 
among technical workers and 21.6 percent among clerical and sales workers. 
This figure underestimates the differences in total compensation, however, by 
failing to take into account the higher levels of non-wage benefits for union 
workers and the greater use of part-time and contingent workers among non-
union employers (Batt and Strausser 1998; Batt and Keefe 1999). 
Another source of rising wage inequality is the increasing dispersion within 
both the union and the non-union segments. Among unionized sales and clerical 
workers, the 90/10 wage ratio increased from 2.00 in 1983 to 2.43 in 1996; for 
the non-union group, it grew at a higher rate, from 3.30 to 4.25 over the same 
period. The story of the changing wage structure between union and non-union 
technical workers is quite different than for clerical and sales workers. For non-
union workers, the 90/10 ratio remained unchanged (at 3.13) for the period. In 
the union segment, the opposite occurred: the 90/10 ratio increased 31.5 percent 
for union workers (from 1.71 to 2.25). The increased wage dispersion is equally 
attributable to a decline in the lower 10th percentile (during the 1980s) and an 
increase in wages in the upper 90th percentile (in the 1990s). 
The increase in wage dispersion in the union segment has several sources. 
These include: 
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a) customer segmentation strategies (discussed above) designed to fragment 
job functions and link employee groups to market segments, raising wage 
dispersion across wage grades; 
b) contingent and commission pay strategies (discussed above); 
c) negotiated two-tier wage structures; 
d) union strategies to negotiate pay raises primarily at the high end of any 
wage grade - for workers with 5 years seniority who traditionally com-
prise the bulk of the workforce. 
In the 1990s, the companies misjudged the demand for new services, particu-
larly the Internet, and downsized more than necessary. As a result, they have 
hired more new employees at entry level wages, which raises dispersion within 
wage grades. 
In the non-union segment, it is also notable that for both occupational groups, 
non-union workers at the high end (90th percentile) experienced falling real 
wages: 11 percent among clerical and sales workers and 7 percent among tech-
nical workers. This finding runs contrary to the idea that the market demand for 
highly technical skills (whether in office computers or programming skills) 
would raise wage dispersion. That is, among non-union workers, the higher 
skilled workers found their wages falling despite the common perception that 
technical skills are in short supply. 
7. Conclusions 
In summary, recent research demonstrates that the partial deregulation of tele-
communications service markets in the United States has led to profound 
changes in corporate structure, work organization, union density, and labor mar-
ket outcomes in the fifteen years since the break-up of the Bell System. Union 
institutions have had relatively little influence over the course of restructuring, 
despite the prior existence of an industry-wide collective bargaining system and 
despite various attempts at labor-management pacts to jointly reorganize work. 
Rather, unions have negotiated successfully to minimize the negative effects of 
restructuring for displaced workers and for the survivor workforce. Union den-
sity, while still high compared to other U.S. industries, has fallen by almost half. 
Business strategy, process reeengineering, and the availability of advanced 
information systems have been the primary drivers of change in work organiza-
tion and employment relations. Companies have shifted their orientation from 
public service to strategic segmentation of markets. The prior system of national 
internal labor markets has been transformed into a much more fragmented 
structure. Core jobs in customer services and network operations have become 
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much more specialized, and within occupational variation has increased with 
respect to skills and training, use of technology, work design, and pay. 
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